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AN AUSTRALIAN TEST OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MODELS
OF WELFARE STATE EXPENDITURES: 1945 - 1979
Gordon W. Ternowetsky and Maurreen P. Clissold
Department of Sociology
La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT
This paper tests 'political' and 'economic' models of
welfare expenditure with post-World War II Australian data.
The major antecedents of welfare spending for the overall
time period (1945-1979) appeared to be economic growth as
mediated by the age of the population and program
incrementalism. It was shown, however, that this view
misleads rather than clarifies the influence of different
factors during specific periods within the overall time
series. A periodization of welfare spending was found to be
more useful. The periodization analysis showed that the
influence of politics on welfare spending is important.
Right political strength was found to have a negative impact
on spending levels and the equality of aged pensioner
incomes. It was also shown that program incrementalism does
not reduce inequality.
Introduction
One apparent contribution of causal modelling to research
on the welfare state is that it isolates the factors which
directly and indirectly explain the growth of welfare
expenditures. To date, however, the conclusions drawn from
this research have often been contradictory. One body of
findings suggests that economic growth and its bureaucratic
and demographic outcomes are the major determinants of
increased welfare spending (Wilensky, 1975; Dye, 1976).
Some of the evidence in support of this view adds that, once
a high stage of development is reached, political factors
also shape the direction and coverage of social security
programs (Cutright, 1965, 1967a). Even in these studies,
however, economic development remains the major determinant
of welfarism. Other findings discount this
growth/expenditure hypothesis. It is suggested that
expenditure levels depend on the power of left of centre and
reformist groups to re-allocate the products of growth
(Castles and McKinlay, 1979).
This paper evaluates the usefulness of these analytical
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models for explaining Australian welfare expenditures. The
first section reviews a selected number of cross-national
studies which compare the influence of developmental and
political factors on welfare spending. This is followed
with a brief description of the Australian Welfare State.
The final section tests these views with post-World War II
Australian data covering 34 years.
Studies on The Welfare State
The most influential support for the growth/expenditure
thesis comes from Wilensky's (1975) cross national study of
welfare effort among some sixty countries. Welfare effort
(SWE) is operationalized as the ratio of cash transfers to
the 'at risk' population over Gross National Product (GNP).
Using time series and cross-sectional data Wilensky
(1975:24) demonstrates ' ... that economic growth is the
ultimate cause of welfare-state expenditure.' Ideology (the
belief in equality), the nature of the political system
(liberal/democratic vs totalitarianism) and military
spending are not crucial predictors. What he does show is
that although economic growth is the underlying cause, this
is mediated by two outcomes of growth. These are
demographic changes in the age of the population and program
incrementalism which follows once welfare measures are
initiated.
These findings guide Wilensky's (1976) later work on the
sources of welfare backlash in high GNP nations.
'With economic growth, the percentage of aged goes
up, which indirectly makes for an early and swift
spread of social security programs, and this, in
turn is expressed in big spending' (Wilensky,
1976:13).
In Wilensky's work political factors are found to be
insignificant determinants of welfare expenditure. Castles
and McKinlay (1979:157) describe this 'politics doesn't
matter' approach as the 'prevailing orthodoxy' of
'convergence' which characterises sociological views of the
antecedents of public policy. Regardless of diverse
cultural and political traditions between nations,
convergence implies that economic development and the 'logic
of industrialization' lead to both a reduction of inequality
and the emergence of similar social service strategies to
rescue those unable to keep up with growth.
Two earlier studies by Cutright (1965,1967a) support this
'developmentalist' view of welfarism. The first looks at
the Social Insurance Program Experience (SIPE) of seventy
six countries between 1930 and 1960. SIPE is defined as the
sum, in years, of five major programs - work/injury,
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sickness/maternity, old age/invalid, family allowances and
unemployment benefits. Cutright (1965) shows that the level
of economic development (measured by energy consumption) is
the most powerful predictor of social security coverage
(r=.90). When the level of economic development is
controlled, Cutright also finds that among the highly
developed nations a political representativeness index, PRI
(the government's response to the needs of the people)
correlates positively with welfare effort. He concludes,
however, that the bearing of PRI on welfare coverage depends
primarily on the 'level of economic development enjoyed by
nations' (Cutright, 1965:547). This priority of growth is
demonstrated in the finding that among the top developed
nations, both democratic and non-democratic countries have
similar levels of social security coverage (Cutright,
1965:547).
Cutright's (1967a) second study, which compares changes in
welfare expenditure (SWE/GNP) in forty nations between 1957
and 1960, gives more credence to political factors. SIPE,
the proportion of labour in industry (an indicator of
modernization) and voter participation (a measure of
equalitarian pressure within a polity) explain 93% of the
variance in SWE/GNP. Economic development as measured by
per capita GNP is again crucial as different patterns emerge
in high and low developed nations. Among the former a
regression analysis returns a beta score of .459 between PRI
and SWE/GNP. In the latter, this coefficient reduces to
.329 which implies that politics does matter, although to a
smaller degree among lesser developed nations.
Are welfare expenditures redistributive? This question is
not tested by Cutright or Wilensky although both argue
social security outlays have a levelling effect (see
Cutright, 1967b:189; Wilensky, 1975:86-119). This
assertion is tested, in part, in Jackman's (1974)
cross-sectional analysis of the welfare experience of sixty
western and third-world countries. Jackman compares the
impact of growth and political democratization on three
dependent variables; SIPE, the Schutz coefficient of
intersectorial inequality[l] and a Social Welfare Index
(SWI). SWI and Schutz's coefficient are treated as final
outcome measures of inequality and are analyzed in two
separate models. In both cases economic development has a
significant, direct influence on SIPE, SWI and Schutz.
Paths from the political variable are not significantly
different from zero and indicate that democratic performance
has only a minor influence on welfare expenditures and
equality. Jackman (1974:40) qualifies this and suggests
that the impact of politics is mediated by SIPE which is a
'political variable' that taps legislative commitment 'in
the social welfare domain'.
The work of Castles and McKinlay (1979) is an exception to
the findings discussed so far. Using crossectional data
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from 19 OECD countries they test the relations between
development, public welfare commitment, and the extent to
which the size of the vote for rightist parties is
associated with a decline in public welfare. They find no
relationship between levels of economic development amd
public welfare expenditure in democratic states.[2]
Alternatively, they point to the importance of politics by
showing that growth in the strength of parties on the right
leads to a decrease in social welfare effort. According to
Castles and McKinlay (1979:163) 'a necessary condition' for
high levels of welfare provision is a party on the right
which is small, disjointed and unable to block expansionist
policies. This is the case as conservative parties
traditionally restrict welfare legislation and thereby limit
spending.
Hage and Hanneman's (1977) study of welfare in Britain,
France, Germany and Ireland from 1880 to 1965 also reveals
the importance of politics for assessing the responsiveness
of governments to 'unmet need'. Composite indicators of
supply (as a measure of economic development) and demand (an
indicator of expenditures on need) are constructed and
expressed as ratios of GDP per capita. An 'unmet need'
score is used to assess the number of years it will take, at
current expenditure levels, to meet present demand. The
political variables are defined in terms of left and right
strength with the former favouring expansion and the latter
the restriction of the welfare sector. Like Wilensky's
findings, the results indicate that resources and the level
of demand influence spending. Politics is, however, vital
as government responsiveness to 'unmet need' grows with
increases in the strength of the left (Hage and Hanneman,
1977:27). Hage and Hanneman (1977:33) qualify these
findings by cautioning that time series research on patterns
of welfare expenditure needs to consider the 'historical
specificity' of different countries, as well as short-run
changes and reversals of spending within countries. In time
series analyses there are certain periods where the pattern
of relations do no reflect the trend suggested in the total
series. These 'periodization' scores reflect important
changes and reversals that are often obscured by the gross
correlations of the overall series.
One possible reason for the disparate results in the
studies reviewed is that different operational indicators
are used as measures of similar theoretical constructs.
There are other difficulties which suggest that care is
needed when assessing the findings from these studies. For
example, in Wilensky's work the political indicators tap
systems of government but are poor measures of the dynamics
of sectional politics within nation states. Grouping
nations by levels of development is also problematic. A
case in point is evident in Wilensky's (1975) group of the
22 richest countries. The $2600 variation in per capita GNP
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is more than three times the $882 GNP per capita score of
Ireland, the poorest of the wealthiest countries. This
stratification factor conceals important differences in
nations grouped into similar strata and hides the fact that
Ireland, for example, seems to be closer to the GNP levels
of some of the middle and low GNP countries. Most research
also assumes linear and annual increments in the long-run
expenditures on welfare. Given the causal relations posited
in the developmental model one would anticipate short-run
reversals or a periodization of welfare expenditures.
Within political models, fluctuations also seem inherent as
universalist and residualist philosophies expand and wane
with changes in legislative authority in a society.
Serious methodological problems are also encountered as
detrending, which is customary with times series data, seems
to be consistently omitted (Ezekiel and Fox, 1959:325-47).
Without detrending, successive time series observations
remain dependent on earlier values. The 'least squares'
solutions used by these authors are therefore questionable,
as the assumption of uncorrelated residuals is violated.
Dependent error terms in regression analysis lead to
problems of serial correlation, autocorrelation and
multicollinearity which all, but Jackman (1974), do not
mention. Zald (1977:944) criticises Wilensky's (1975)
failure to check for these methodological problems which
seriously erode the precision of regression estimates. For
Wilensky this is particularly troublesome as his theoretical
and empirical argument rests on the strength of the
coefficients in his regression model.
Welfare Coverage in Australia
Australian welfare dates back to the 1880's and '90's
which remain the 'seedbed' of much of the social legislation
developed in Australia (Mendelsohn, 1979:42). In these
years self-help organisations were the main providers of
welfare. State governments began their interventionist role
by assisting these groups during recessions. It is notable
that in this period there were also early and innovative
advances in labor legislation and health and educational
policies (Mendelsohn, 1979:42). Some of the factors which
stimulated these governmental initiatives are listed by
Jones (1980). He suggests that the highly urbanized
population at the turn of the century forced governments
into action. Jones (1980:8) also adds that at this time,
state governments were already employing around 10% of the
workforce, a factor which conditioned a pre-disposition to
government intervention. By the early 1900's people began
to look 'increasingly to the state rather than private
agencies' (Roe, 1976:8). Graycar (1979:21) adds, however,
that while Australia was a leading nation in welfare
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legislation, in practice services were fashioned after an
ameliorative and 'moralistic' approach to inequality.
At federation in 1901, welfare provisions were still the
responsibility of State governments. The new Federal
government gained greater authority with the introduction of
selective age (1909) and invalid (1910) pensions. In 1912
the first universal benefit, maternity, allowances was
introduced. The most significant welfare related
legislation took place in 1907 with the introduction of the
minimum wage. This considered the needs of people
independently of market forces and constitutes 'a
pre-condition of the welfare state' (Jones, 1980:19).
Welfare innovativeness waned during the inter-war years
which Mendelsohn (1979:44) characterizes as an era of
'disappointment and ... loss of vision'. This stagnation
was halted by World War II which led to a decade of
'unprecedented state experiment and intervention' (Roe,
1976:108,218). Basically a period of Labor rule, new
services were implemented and expenditures increased by over
600 per cent between 1940 and 1950 (Kewley, 1965:135,307).
In 1941, the final days before Labor assumed power, child
endowment entitlements were introduced by the United
Australia Party, the precursor of the current conservative,
Liberal/Country Party Coalition. Many of the cash benefits
and services presently available were later initiated by
Labor in the war years. Some examples include widows
pensions, unemployment, sickness, hospital and funeral
benefits. The federal government also gained greater
constitutional authority in welfare and by 1949, with the
return of a non-Labor government, the Commonwealth
superseded the states in social service expenditures
(Partridge in Roe, 1976:218).
For the next 23 years, from 1949 until 1972, the Coalition
consolidated and developed further welfare legislation
during years of 'unexampled prosperity' (Mendelsohn,
1979:46). GDP rose steadily and increased six fold by the
beginning of 1972 (Mendelsohn, 1979:62). There were also
dramatic demographic changes brought on by large scale
migration, declining death rates, an ageing population and
the post-war baby boom. These demographic shifts pushed the
levels of expenditure upwards.
The return of Labor under Whitlam in 1972, witnessed
another rapid acceleration of public expenditure. Labor
policies were aimed at achieving greater income equality
(Scotton and Ferber, 1978:18) and removing residualist
thinking which still characterized Australian welfare.
Labor experienced numerous problems in implementing its more
innovative schemes like the Australian Assistance Plan. The
traditional ameliorative approach of government
bureaucracies, an economic recession, high inflation, plus
the lack of specific constitutional authority to legislate
in certain areas of welfare, were among the most pressing of
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these constraints.
A 'fight inflation first' policy guided the efforts of the
Coalition after it resumed power in 1975. The universal
policies of Labor were supplanted by a return to residualism
which Graycar (1979:51) characterizes as a 'consistent move
from reform to reaction'. While some of the advances of
Labor were eroded, in the area of child endowment the
Coalition introduced substantial payment increases which
appear to be redistributive (Jones, 1980:104; Borrie,
1978).
Economic growth from 1945-1979 is the supply side of
welfare state expenditures. On the demand side of this
equation are demographic shifts in the character and size of
the 'at risk' population. One would expect a relation
between supply and demand although the shape and stability
of this association needs to be tested. This is suggested
in Wilensky's (1976) finding that Australia, once a world
leader in welfare, has in the latter half of this century
become a world laggard. The influence of sectional politics
is one factor which may mediate the generosity and scope of
Australian social security coverage. It appears that the
Labor party, in alliance with bodies sensitive to the needs
of workers, is a 'pacemaker' which is more likely to advance
expansionism in welfare (Mendelsohn, 1979:394).
Methods
Data from 1945 to 1979 were used to create two sets of
indicators to test the influence of developmental and
political factors on Australian patterns of welfare
expenditure.[3] The first cluster consisted of factor cost
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) values as a measure of growth,
the age of the population shown by changes in the proportion
of the population of pensionable age (% AGED), and program
incrementalism (SIPE). SIPE is the added score of the
experience (in years) of six social welfare programs: age
and invalid pensions, maternity allowances, sickness and
unemployment benefits and child endowment (the Australian
equivalent of family allowance which was included in
Cutright's SIPE index). These cumulated scores were then
multiplied by the annual cost incurred in administering the
Commonwealth Social Security system from 1945-1979. This
provided a measure which tapped both the program experience
and expenditure dimensions of incrementalism.
Sectional politics was measured with two indicators of
Right and Left strength. Right strength is the summed,
standardized score of the following political dimensions:
1. the proportion of seats held by the Liberal/Country
Party Coalition in the lower house,
2. the proportion of votes received by these parties,
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3. the proportion of the workforce in farm and defense, and
4. the number of self-employed.
The Left index consisted of the following elements which
were expressed as z scores and summed:
1. the proportion of Labor seats held in the lower house,
2. the proportion of votes received by Labor,
3. the proportion of the work force which is unionized, and
4. the number of unemployed.
Items 3 and 4 above are not usual measures of political
strength. Following Hage and Hanneman (1977:15,16) they
were included as further measures of 'the relative power of
groups favoring an increased or decreased government role
... in ... social welfare effort.' A growth in the number of
unemployed, for example, would result in greater pressure on
governments to intervene with appropriate policy strategies.
Welfare expenditure (SWE) was defined as cash transfers by
the Federal government to the 'at risk' population. Like
Wilensky's measure it excluded outlays on health, housing
and education. The cost of admistering social security was
also excluded. These annual expenditures were then
expressed as a proportion of GDP.
A welfare output variable was also constructed to assess
the equalitarian impact of expenditures on aged pensions.
This measure (RELPEN) was calculated by expressing the
annual rate of age pensions as a ratio of average male
earnings.
Raw and detrended values were used in the analysis.
Detrending followed the method of 'first differences' which
amounted to calculating the difference between a measure
from one year to the next and using over time fluctuations,
rather than actual values in the analysis (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1976:111).
Findings and Discussion
Table 1 presents the raw and detrended correlations for
the years 1945-1979. The raw scores between GDP and the
correlates of growth (SIPE and % AGED) show strong to
moderate positive relations with the welfare variables.
Both Left and Right strength are moderately correlated with
the welfare variables. Left is more strongly related to the
equalitarian output measure (.416). Right strength, on the
other hand, has little impact on pension levels but seems to
have some influence on expenditure levels (.447) which in
turn has a strong equalitarian influence (.864) on pensions.
The detrended scores are generally lower. The influence
of GDP on the welfare measures reduces but is still quite
strong. Scores for SIPE and % AGED are also lower but
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retain a substantial impact on both expenditures and
equality. A coefficient of .694 between SWE and pension
levels (RELPEN) indicates that welfare expenditures continue
to influence the income equality of aged pensioners.
Detrending shows that the political variables are among the
least important antecedents of welfarism. The correlations
are either very low, or tend to disappear entirely.
TABLE 1
RAW AND DETRENDED CORRELATIONS
(in brackets) BETWEEN DEVELOPMENTAL,
POLITICAL AND WELFARE VARIABLES: 1945-1979
(XI) (X2) (X3) (X4) (X5) (X6) (X7)
GDP LEFT RIGHT(3) %AGED SIPE SWE RELPEN
Xi 1.00 .096 .421 .973 .969 .863 .589
(.029) (.173) (.606) (.931) (.727) (.606)
X2 1.00 -.477 -. 048 .219 .261 .416
(-.722) (.142) (-.016) (-.074) (.260)
X3 1.00 .358 .425 .447 .249
(-.011) (.152) (.248) (-.021)
X4 1.00 .904 .708 .466
(.502) (.542) (.483)
X5 1.00 .944 .749
(.728) (.507)
X6 1.00 .864
(.694)
1.00
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Both sets of correlations in Table 1 comply with
Wilensky's model that growth, demographic shifts in the age
of the population and program incrementalism are the major
determinants of greater spending which is equated with
increased equalitarianism. Such an interpretation can,
however, be misleading. Following Hage and Hanneman's
(1977) suggestion the raw and detrended GDP and expenditure
variables were plotted to test for periodization. The raw
plot revealed three reversals between the general upward or
downward movement of SWE and the consistent upward movement
of GDP. These turning points, 1951, 1962 and 1971, seem to
denote different post war periods of welfare development in
Australia.
The first and third periods (1945-50 and 1962-71) are
characterized by a general fall in SWE while GDP climbs.
Both indicators move upward between the years 1951-62 and
1972-79. In the latter interval, however, there is a steep
escalation in both which may partially explain the strong
correlation noted for the overall series in Table 1.
The correlations for these periods are presented in Table
2. What these imply is that the demand/suppy relationship
is less straightforward than that suggested by
'developmentalists' and the data in Table 1. This is
clearly illustrated in the raw correlations between GDP and
SWE. The score of .863 for the complete series is often
markedly different in the four lesser periods: 1945-50,
-. 477; 1951-1961, .727; 1962-1971, -. 919; 1972-1979,
.991. Detrended values also reflect some periodization
although the pattern is not as evident. What they do
highlight are the pitfalls of an uncritical acceptance of
the growth/expenditure hypothesis in Australia. Only one
period (1972-1979) reveals a positive correlation between
welfare expenditure and economic growth (.669). The others
are all negative (-.824, -. 680 and -. 321).
One conclusion that can be drawn from these zero-order
scores is that the general time series models used in
overseas and cross-national studies are not really
appropriate for Australia. A model of periodization seems
to be more useful in that it is sensitive to fluctuations
and reversals which seem to fit welfare spending patterns in
Australia.
Whether the above relations are maintained, when the
influence of the other variables in the model are
controlled, was checked with regression analyses. The
findings for the overall series and the latter three
mini-series are presented in Figure 1 and Table 3. It was
necessary to use detrended values as collinearity in the raw
data produced beta scores greater than 1 in each of the
tests. Detrending, however, only partially reduced this
problem as multicollinearity was not eliminated for the
1962-1971 and 1972-79 time periods.
The first regression for the overall period showed that
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TABLE 2
A. Gross correlations, raw and detrended data, 1945-50, 1951-61 (shown
below diagonal). Correlations for detrended data shown in brackets.
GDP LEFT RIGHT % AGED SIPE
-. 559 .214
(-.118) (.438)
-.879
(-.913)
-. 229
(-.605)
-.588
(-.215)
-.484
(-.052)
-. 222
(.272)
-.153
-. 009
(.519)
-. 226
(-.167)
-. 133
(.066)
-. 316
.891
(-.872)
-.269
(.587)
-.166
(-.816)
.951
(.358)
.727
(.291)
.269
.879
(.190)
-.761
(-.957)
.435
(.834)
.799
(-.611)
.746
(.199)
.266
SWE RELPEN
-.477
(-.824)
-.177
(-.446)
.158
(.054)
-. 329
(.469)
-. 084
(.399)
-. 887
(-.100)
.530
(.023)
-.119
(.182)
-. 815
(.046)
-.735
(-.308)
.250
(-.118)
(-.175) (.305) (-.217) (.306) (.124) (.574)
B. Gross correlations, raw and detrended data, 1962-71, 1972-79 (shown
below diagonal). Correlations for detrended data shown in brackets.
GDP LEFT RIGHT % AGED SIPE SWE
-.676 .201
(.470) (-.628)
-.777
(-.848)
.672
(-.132)
.750
(.106)
.823
(.450)
.674
(-.236)
-.560
(-.822)
.101
(.076)
-.041
(-.485)
-.192
(-.661)
-.125
(.197)
.878
(.322)
-.362
(.078)
-.178
(-.122)
.965
(-.233)
.934
(-.127)
.963
(.159)
.985
(.820)
-.665
(.439)
.161
(-.533)
.904
(.524)
.983
(.514)
.979
(-.067)
-.919
(-.321)
.773
(-.049)
-.443
(-.O11)
-.652
(.544)
-.868
(-.125)
.964
(.541)
-.102
(-.639)
.776
(.336)
.965
(.033)
.995
(.773)
.991
(.659)
.971
(.221)
RELPEN
-.931
(.026)
.726
(.205)
-.297
(-.363)
-.804
(-.004)
-.944
(-.298)
.898
(.496)
Variables
GDP
LEFT
RIGHT
% AGED
SIPE
SWE
RELPEN
-.569
(.013)
-.111
(-.492)
.989
(-.529)
.981
(-.131)
.727
(-.670)
.261
Variables
GDP
LEFT
RIGHT
% AGED
SIPE
S'dE
RELPEN
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Right strength was the only variable not significantly
related to at least one of the endogenous variables.[4] It
was therefore dropped and the remaining variables regressed.
Figure 1 shows that the Left index does not have the
predicted influence on SWE or SIPE. Both paths are small
and negative and suggest that program experience and
expenditures are independent of the left. Its main impact
is on equality (RELPEN) where it has a modest (but
significant) influence on the the relative level of aged
pensions. The compound paths through SIPE from LEFT to
RELPEN also suggest that, although the left has little
bearing on incrementalism of Australian welfare, the
influence it has is translated into greater equality. Given
that Australia has had conservative Coalition governments
for the greater part of the time since 1945, this may imply
that the power of the left, as suggested by Hage and
Hanneman, maintains a modest influence on pensioner income
equality even though it lacks legislative authority.
GDP is a powerful antecedent of SWE although its influence
is mainly indirect through the proportion of aged (.602 x
.225) and SIPE (.987 x .458). These patterns comply with
Wilensky's and Cutright's findings that growth leads to
demographic and incremental changes which result in 'big
spending'. There is also some support for the view that
economic growth leads directly and indirectly to greater
equality. The path from GDP to RELPEN of .710 is large and
statistically significant from zero. GDP also has indirect
and compound influences on equalilty through SWE which has
an important influence on pension levels. The strong,
inverse relationship between incrementalism and pension
levels suggests, however, that the historical impact of
welfare coverage does not reduce inequality.
The major antecedents of SWE in the total series appear to
be economic growth as mediated by the age of the population
and program incrementalism. Most of the variance in SWE can
be attributed to these 'developmental' variables. The
Durbin-Watson (1951) statistic also shows that
methodologically the model for SWE is sound as it is not
significantly influenced by autocorrelation. The
Durbin-Watson test also indicates, however, that the
regression estimates for equality (RELPEN) are inconclusive.
Collinearity between the independent variables still exists
and therby makes the validity of the beta coefficients
questionable (Zald,1977). Overall, however, the pattern for
the estimates of RELPEN is quite straightforward. It offers
more support for the growth/expenditure hypothesis although
the influence of the left on the equality of pension levels
is also apparent.
Table 3 compares the path coefficient between the latter
three mini-series and the total period. The former
coefficients need to be treated with exploratory caution
because of the small n and the existence of
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multicollinearity in two periods [5].
These results again reveal that it is necessary to be
suspicious of findings which offer unqualified support for
the growth hypothesis. For example, in 1951-61 GDP is
negatively related to SWE, SIPE and the proportion of aged.
During this era, Australia moved into a post-war economic
boom. The population, spurred by migration, grew while wage
levels were low and pensions and benefits near subsistence.
With these facts in mind, the inverse effect of GDP on the
age of the population, and SWE are more readily understood.
This negative impact on SWE is repeated in the 1962-71
series, a period of declining birth rates, reduced
immigration, the rediscovery of poverty and the public
recognition of the existing inadequacies in social welfare
coverage. The coefficients in the final period, however,
all correspond with the direction noted in the overall
series.
The unsuitability of the developmentalist's model is also
demonstrated in the % AGED coefficients. Unlike the pattern
of consistency suggested by Wilensky, the association
between the proportion of aged and SWE is equivical in these
mini-series. In two of the periods the relations are not
only small, but are also negative.
Does politics matter? The findings for the overall period
in Figure 1 point to the small but vital influence of the
left on pension levels. The scores in Table 3 point out,
however, that left strength is negligiable for 1951-61, and
negative in the years 1962-71. Left appears to have an
impact only after 1972 when Labor came to power and
initiated massive changes in benefit levels. Does this now
mean that for the left to influence equality it requires the
legislative strength to enact its policy commitments? While
this remains a rich area of research, the unanticipated
coefficients with the remaining welfare variables in the
1972 onward period, do not support this 'pacemaker' role.
The fact that Labor was in power for only a few years before
the return of the Coalition and its big cuts in Welfare
spending, may explain some of this apparent discrepency.[6]
While there is room for equivocation when the role of the
left in welfare growth is examined, it is still clear that
politics does matter. In each of the sub-series growth of
the right is followed by lower levels of equalitarianism in
pension levels and welfare expenditures. Compared to the
overall model in Figure 1, this is a crucial difference as
right strength returns at least one significant beta score
for each of the smaller periods. So politics does matter in
Australia, in the sense that a large or growing party on the
right restricts welfare expansionism.
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TABLE 3
A Comparison of Path Coefficients for the Total Series (1945-79)
and the Periods 1951-61, 1962-71, 1972-79
Variables Years
GDP (Xl) Paths 1945-79 1951-61 1962-71 1972-79
RELPEN (X7) p17 .710 .411 1.19 .538
SWE (X6) p16 .167 -.755 -.728 .514
SIPE (X5) p15 .987 -.237 .695 .632
% AGED (X4) p14 .602 -.363 .405 .086
LEFT (X2)
RELPEN (X7) p2 7  .285 .010 -.101 .898
SWE (X6) p2 6  -.103 .162 -.307 -.538
SIPE (X5) p2 5  -.030 -.434 .134 -.547
% AGED (X4) p24  .124 -.006 -.001 -.003
RIGHT (X3)
RELPEN (X7) p37 - -.514 -.229 -.124
SWE (X6) p36 - -.203 -. 745 -.169
SIPE (X5) p35 - -.850 .053 -.595
% AGED (X4) p34 - .337 .131 -.164
% AGED (X4)
RELPEN (X7) p47 -.040 .647 -.335 .061
SWE (X6) p46 +.225 -.005 .823 -.163
SIPE (X5) p45  -.092 .580 .296 -.290
SIPE (X5)
RELFEN (X7) p57 -.612 -. 303 -1.11 -. 613
SWE (X6) p56 .458 -.074 -. 226 -. 164
S E (x6)
RELPEN (X7) p67 .671 .786 .920 1.15
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Some Conclusions
The above findings illustrate the need for caution when
general time-series models, developed in other countries,
are used uncritically in the Australian context.
Aggregation tends to mislead rather than clarify the
influence of different factors during specific periods.
Some important regularities do, however, emerge and several
generalizations can be made about the antecedents of
Australian welfare expenditures. These are listed below:
1. Pension levels relative to average male earnings are
positively influenced by growth.
2. SWE has an equalitarian impact on the level of pensioner
incomes.
Both of these patterns correspond with the
'developmentalist' view that growth leads to equality both
directly and indirectly through existing social security
spending.
There are other regularities which do not hold to this
view of welfare statism. These suggest that equality is not
an automatic outcome of social security programing and that,
in Australia, the growth of right strength has a negative
influence on both welfare expenditures and equality. These
regularities are listed below:
3. Social Insurance Program Experience (SIPE) has a
consistent, negative impact on the equality of pensioner
income levels. This appears to be a persistent
characteristic of Australian welfarism.
4. In all of the mini-series growth of the Right has a
negative influence on social welfare expenditures (SWE).
5. Growth of the Right is followed by a decrease in the
equality of pension incomes. This is another persistent
feature of welfare statism in Australia.
Points 4 and 5 are in sharp contrast to the view that
political factors have little bearing on the patterns of
welfare spending in modern, industrial society. They show
that political strength, in terms of the power of the right,
needs to be included in models of welfare expenditure in
Australia. The findings discussed in this paper also
indicate that overall time series models lack utility when
applied to periods within a series. It seems clear that
efforts to build models of welfare statism in Australia
should take into account period fluctuations as well as the
strength of the right. The recurring patterns listed in
the above generalizations also provide crucial insights into
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the antecedents of welfarism in Australia. While these need
to be treated as exploratory, they provide useful guidelines
for future research on welfare expenditures in this country.
Footnotes
[1]Intersectorial income inequality is also used by Cutright
(1967b) in a study not reported on in this paper. This
measure compares worker incomes between different sectors in
the economy. Cutright like Jackson shows that income
inequality reduces in advanced technological societies.
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) re-analyze Jacksons's and
Cutrights's findings but substitute personal income for
intersectorial income. They conclude that development and
democratization have a negative influence of income
equaltiy.
[21 In a footnote Castles and McKinlay (1979:164) provide
the results of a re-analysis of Wilensky's data on 66
countries. They obtain a coefficient of -0.16 between
development and welfare effort. What they suggest is that
even in Wilensky's data 'economic development is wholly
irrelevant as an explanation of welfare spending in advanced
nations'. By failing to disaggregate high and low countries
Wilensky (and also Cutright) has 'fallen foul of the
ecological fallacy by affirming that countries with extra
resources have more to devote to welfare than less advanced
countries' (1977:164).
[3]The data used in this study originates with the Annual
Reports of the Department of Social Security, National
Accounts, Budget Speeches, The Annual Labour Report, The
Commonwealth Yearbook and a statistical series developed by
Butlin (1977). Butlin provides the only complete series on
average income which is indexed to 1966 dollars. GDP, SWE
and SIPE used constant 1979 dollars.
[41A .05 test of significance was used. Beta values for the
Right index with the dependent variables were as follows:
RELPEN (-.026), SWE (.183), SIPE (-.098), and % AGED
(-.058).
[5] The small 'n' in these periodization regressions makes
it impractical to adhere to any particular level of
significance. The path values need to be considered as
demonstrating possible relationships. Because of the small
'n' it was not possible to calculate Beta values for the
1945-50 series, for the 1945-50 series were not calculable.
[6] The strong relation between the left and the pensioner
income variable may be maintained as the lowering of pension
levels would be politically disastrous, for the Coalition,
compared to more general spending reductions in welfare.
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